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Nancy Jecker has concluded that "efforts to appeal to nonidentity 
problems to undermine rights based obligations are unsuccessful." I think 
that's right, but 1 think so for different reasons. I'm going to give you yet 
two more cases to think about. I hope it won't be two too many. The first is 
not my case. It's roughly Derek Parfit's case, and it's designed to illustrate 
the Nonidentity Problem. I think Jecker's case is a good illustration of the 
problem, but I prefer Parfit's, because it's a very ordinary case, and one on 
which I can easily test my intuitions. Parfit calls it 'The 14-Year-Old Girl."1 
A fourteen year old girl is considering having a child. That she is so 
young means that the child will probably get a bad start in life, though its 
life will probably be worth living, and let's assume that it will be worth 
living. If the fourteen year old girl waits until she's older to have her child, 
she will of course have a different child, who will get a better start in life. 
The questions we should consider arc these: Is it worse for her child 
that she has it when she's fourteen, and does she have an obligation to it to 
wait until she can give it a better start? It seems the answers should be 
"yes, it is worse for her child, and yes, she should wait until she can give it a 
better start," since it would be better that her child have a better start in 
life, and she should do what is better for her child. 
Now consider the Nonidentity Problem. If she had her child at 
fourteen, it will still have a life worth living. That cannot be worse than 
never existing, which would be the fate of that child if the girl waited and 
had a different child later on. Having a life worth living might even be 
better than not existing. Hence, her decision to have the child at fourteen 
cannot be harming that child, and may be benefiting that child. How can 
we object to her decision? Should we say that the girl has no obligation to 
wait until she is older to have her child? I think she does not have an 
obligation to her actual child to wait. That is, she does not have an 
obligation to the child that is born when she is fourteen. She might have 
obligations to others to wait, but not to a child that would not exist if she did 
wait. 
I think the way we should approach this whole mess is to first 
recognize what we are referring to when we spenk of "the child." Before the 
girl has decided to have either the child at fourteen or the child later on, 
we can not yet really fix the reference of the words "the child." The best we 
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we can do is say that it refers to a number of possible children that she 
might have, some at fourteen and others later. Some would have better 
starts than others, and she can expect that those she would have at 
fourteen would have worse starts than those she would have later. I think 
it's alright to say that the child would be better off if the child were born 
later, but only if we recognize that we are referring in this odd way; I don't 
think that such a child-that is, a set of possible children—can be the object 
of the girl's obligation. It may still be true that she has an obligation to wait 
to have the child, but it is not an obligation to this child, understood as a 
set of possible children. Whatever obligations she would have arise from 
other sources. 
The Nonidentity Problem enters when we fix the reference of the 
words "the child" on one of the children that would be born to the fourteen 
year old mother. If we believe that our obligations can only be to actual 
people, then the Nonidentity Problem is real. The girl cannot have 
obligations to the child, where those words refer ambiguously to members 
of a set of possible children. She can not be obligated to give the child, 
ambiguously understood, its best possible start. She can only have 
obligations to the child that she actually has, i.e., the child she has at 
fourteen. She would have an obligation to give that child the best start she 
could, but if we wanted to argue that she should not give it any kind of start, 
and instead give another child a better start later on, we could only appeal 
to her obligations to other actual people who might be affected by her 
choice, or perhaps to the promotion of the greater good, but this rejects the 
rights based ethic that we are presuming to defend. 
It would not be fair, though, to grant a greater right to life to some 
simply on the grounds that they will be born into better social 
circumstances, though I think it's odd to say that all possible people have 
an equal right to life, and perhaps not very useful to consider this problem 
in this manner. 
Do these conclusions carry over to problems about future 
generations? I don't think so. 
If we consider the only objects of our obligations to be actual people, 
as we did in The 14-Year-Old Cirl case, then we do not have obligations to 
the set of possible future generations, and an obligation to actualize the 
best one. We only have obligations to the members of actual future 
generations. We would have no obligations that would decide for us 
different person choices, and hence no obligation that would decide 
different generation choices. Our conclusions from The 14-Year-Old Girl 
case would, then, carry over to the future generations case, and the 
Nonidentity would appear to be real here, too. This, though, would be to 
use the wrong sort of case to make sense of our obligations to future 
generations. 
Instead, consider one last case: your obligations to yourself. This case 
is more relevant to the problems regarding our obligations to future 
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generations than The 14-Year-Old Girl case. Though you can think of 
yourself as existing at a particular time, call this a self-stage, the more 
natural way of thinking about your self is as something which endures over 
time, and survives various changes; but acts at particular moments. Your 
obligations to yourself, then, would weigh on you as an agent, at a 
particular time, but would have as its object the enduring self. It would be 
meaningful in this case to talk of making your actual enduring self better 
or worse off by making different self-stage choices, making choices that 
would bring about different future self-stages. You can prudently plan for 
your self-stages or you can ignore them for the immediate gratification of 
your present self; but your obligation to yourself, as it is understood as an 
enduring self, requires that you give consideration to your future self-
stages, perhaps weighted by their probability of becoming actual. 
This is the important difference between your obligation to yourself 
and the fourteen year old girl's obligation to her child. It was not 
meaningful to talk about making the child of the fourteen year old mother 
worse off by making different person choices, but it is meaningful to make 
the enduring self worse off by making different self-stage choices. This 
makes the Nonidentity Problem relevant to The 14-Year-Old Girl case, and 
not to your obligation to yourself. 
I think that the problems regarding our obligations to future 
generations are more like your obligations to yourself. We should think 
about our obligations to future generations as if future generations were 
future stages of an enduring society. We would than have a similar 
obligation to prudently plan for the well-being of future generations, 
regardless of their memberships, since they are continuous with or a stage 
of a society which holds moral significance for us. 
This treatment of The Nonidentity Problem allows us to preserve our 
intuitions about our obligations to future generations, while retaining a 
rights based ethics. It does so by revising the principle which locates rights 
only in the individual. I recognize that this leads to some unusual 
positions. It accepts that society as a whole, enduring over time, is an 
object of our obligations, and rejects the simpler view that only individuals 
can be such objects. There are of course serious dangers here when the 
interests and rights of individuals and the interests and rights of the 
society as a whole conflict, but these dangers are not new, and I think we 
can attend to them. It also would seem to obligate generations, as a whole, 
to consider the consequences of their actions for enduring society, that is if 
we take the analogy of one's obligation to one's self strictly. This might 
require some form of corporate agency, but we might also reject the 
analogy in this respect and claim that only individuals can be the bearers 
of obligations while societies can be the objects of obligations. 
These positions may ultimately be more trouble than they are worth, 
but I think they arc worthy of exploration, especially if our obligations to 
future generations, which I take to be terribly real and terribly important, 
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arc more easily understood by abandoning an individualist view of the 
objects of obligation. 
It occurs to me that there is another way of preserving my intuitions 
about our obligations to protect the interests of future generations, 
retaining a rights based ethics, and avoiding the Nonidentity Problem; 
and, furthermore, it's a way which holds that we only have obligations to 
actual individuals. It works by accepting that we are obligated to avoid 
disrupting other presently existing individuals' pursuits of their legitimate 
conceptions of a good life. Among these conceptions are, certainly, desires 
to raise children who can pursue their own legitimate conceptions of a 
good life. So we have obligations to protect the interests of future people, 
because we have obligations not to defeat the goals of those who wish to 
protect their children's interests. Obviously, by induction, we can see that 
our obligations to presently existing people obligate us to protect the 
interests of future generations, as long as those generations have interests 
in raising children with legitimate interests. 
Note that this docs not obligate us directly to the future generations, 
but I think it docs give us what we would like from an obligation to them, 
without having to worry about their particular identity. If you're 
uncomfortable about extending rights beyond existing individuals, you 
can in this way retain your intuitions that we must not squander the future 
of our descendants. 
